Editor’s Note: What follows is part of a cross-blog survey that explores what Central Eurasia might look like fifteen years from now.

Cross-posted at Georgia and Armenia.

In 2021 the oil will be flowing and Azerbaijan and Georgia will benefit. Georgia will continue to elect democratic leaders and Azerbaijan will continue to have corrupt leaders, supported by the U.S. government, who keep the oil pumping and aren’t wise enough to negotiate the terms of the agreements so that the money from the oil will benefit the population. The elite in Azerbaijan are richer and the army is bigger, but the average citizen hasn’t seen a lot of benefits from the oil. Meanwhile, in Armenia, an opening of the Turkish border is a gateway to the E.U. The border has opened in part because of European pressure on Turkey to get along better with its neighbor. The Armenian Genocide, while still not recognized by the Turkish government, is discussed in intellectual circles more and more. The Armenian leadership has not changed much, and like Azerbaijan, leaders base their legitimacy on the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although the Kosovo earned sovereignty process has given the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership a model to follow to allow Nagorno-Karabakh to exist as an independent state, the leadership has continued to not utilize this solution. In Georgia, the Kosovo earned sovereignty process will give greater hope to the breakaway regions and will create a situation in which political maneuvering will prolong Georgia’s troubles.

But first, it must be taken into consideration that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are small and their success or its failure depends greatly on their more powerful neighbors.

Some major regional issues upon which Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s futures depends (in no particular order):

- U.S.A. vs. Iran

o Armenia is greatly dependent on the United States for foreign aid. In 2006 this amount was $76.5 billion. This amount has decreased over the past years, due in part to U.S. government interest in Central Asia from the War on Terror.

o Armenia is also dependent upon Iran. Iran will supply gas to Armenia beginning in 2007.

o Ethnic Azerbaijanis in Northern Iran (Southern Azerbaijan) have been actively protesting this year [source] and some have even been arrested for peaceful protests. [source] This has been a growing issue for the past few years. [source] Azerbaijanis consist of possibly 24% of Iran’s population.

- E.U. and Turkey

o The E.U. and Turkey in 2021 will be entering its first year of work-force movement if Turkey enters the E.U. in 2014. One can only imagine what that will look like! [source]

- E.U. and NATO and South Caucasus

o The E.U. is focusing on Central Asia in 2007. [source] Will the Caucasus come around again after the 2005 European Neighbourhood Policy country reviews?

o The E.U. adopted an Armenian Action plan for the European Neighbourhood Policy. This is “one of the few recent topics that has met with apparent satisfaction from both the government and the opposition.” [source]

o Azerbaijan is the E.U.’s largest trading partner in the region. [source]

o Georgia is intensifying its discussions with NATO. [source] and [source]

- Georgia vs. Russia

o Although Putin has stated that there is no conflict between Russia and Georgia, [source] we know differently.

But the most important issue in the region is the UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS

- Georgia’s breakaway regions

o Saakashvili believes that he can bring together the breakaway regions of Georgia. [source]

- Nagorno-Karabakh

o In January there will be another meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers. [source]

A lot of what will happen in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh depends on the outcome of Kosovo’s independence. [more on Kosovo state status process] Kosovo’s “earned” sovereignty is the process of allowing an entity to prove that it is worthy of statehood. The following is excerpted from a study that I did of the earned sovereignty process with Nagorno-Karabakh.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE EARNED SOVEREIGNTY RESOLUTION

One of the most common situations is when a people claim the right to self-determination, the larger entity of which it is a part argues for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Recently a new idea has emerged to deal with such situations. Earned sovereignty is designed to create an opportunity for resolving such conflicts through managed devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a state to a substate entity and thereby promotes coexistence between a state and a people by establishing a power sharing agreement. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 354-355) Proponents of earned sovereignty say that it is neutral in the debate between self-determination and sovereignty (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355) and that earned sovereignty bridges the “sovereignty first” and “self-determination first” approaches and draw on their strengths while minimizing their disadvantages. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 385) As the sovereignty and self-determination arguments, according to proponents of earned sovereignty state, “have been reduced to little more than legal and political shields behind which states and substate entities justify their actions,”( P. Williams, J. Hooper and M. Scharf, Resolving Sovereignty Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty 31 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy (2003). p. 349) finding a new way to determine the future status of a state had to emerge to resolve conflicts. The peoples or substate entities are guided through a process of transition to statehood or heightened autonomy in a way that does not undermine the legitimate interest of parent states and of the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 350-351) Proponents of this strategy also state that earned sovereignty re-establishes security and promotes democracy and institution building. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355)

Sovereignty as a term has a “long and troubled history.” (J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979). p. 26) In its common usage, sovereignty means “totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law” as residing in an independent territorial unit: the state. (J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1979). p. 26) Those states, entities, and individuals who generally believe sovereignty is more important than self-determination in determining a people’s status generally want to preserve their territorial integrity. They believe that the state has exclusive jurisdiction to exercise political power and authority within borders and has the right to exercise anything necessary to preserve its territorial integrity from threats. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 352) The international community often opts for sovereignty over self-determination as well. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 353) Those supporting sovereignty over self-determination often perceive earned sovereignty as “potential destabilizing to the current international order by promoting the separation of substate entities from their parent states.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 350-351)

Those states, entities, and individuals preferring self-determination are often secessionist movements and small states without significant minority populations. They believe that all self-identified groups with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic way and should be free from persecution. Self-government is often realized through the creation of an autonomous province within the parent state and sometimes secession. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 353) They often perceive earned sovereignty as “a means for raising the bar for independence.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 351)

Proponents of earned sovereignty claim that these two positions can both be appeased by earned sovereignty because it is “an inherently flexible process implemented over a variable time period.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355) Earned sovereignty encourages a new view of sovereignty existing as a spectrum. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 374)

Earned sovereignty is defined by three core elements: one, shared sovereignty in which the state, or an international organization, and the substate entity both exercise some sovereign authority over a territory for a specified period of time (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355); two, institution building in which the substate entity undertakes to construct new institutions for self-government (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355), and three, determination of final status, in which the relationship between the state and the substate entity is determined with the consent of the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 355)

Earned sovereignty may also have three optional elements to increase the flexibility of the plan: one, phased sovereignty in which the substate entity gets increasing sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time before the determination of final status (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356); two, conditional sovereignty in which the substate entity is required to meet certain benchmarks before it can acquire increased sovereignty (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356); and three, constrained sovereignty where there are continued limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356)

When the time comes to determine the final status of the substate entity, any type of internal or external self-determination could happen from substantial autonomy to full independence. This decision is often made through either some sort of referendum or in negotiations and usually involves the international community. (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 365)

Many conflicts that involve the self-determination versus sovereignty debate have utilized earned sovereignty: East Timor (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 356), Serbia and Montenegro (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 357), Northern Ireland (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 357), Bougainville and Papua New Guinea (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Bosnia (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Kosovo (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 358), Sudan (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 359), Israel and Palestine (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 359), and Western Sahara (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 360). There are many more self-determination versus sovereignty conflicts that are still unresolved; could earned sovereignty work in these cases as well?

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY SOLUTION

As Nagorno-Karabakh is a classic self-determination versus sovereignty issue, could earned sovereignty be the best route for this region? By examining what all three sides as well as other interested parties have stated as their desires, an earned sovereignty plan could emerge According to the International Crisis Group; the Armenian negotiators want to call for a settlement which would make explicit that status remains an open question. (Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace International Crisis Group Europe Report 167 11 October 2005. p. 12) This implies that the Armenian side is considering earned sovereignty as a possibility.

A group of international lawyers designed an earned sovereignty plan for the region and believe that their proposal is “designed to produce a phased resolution of the crisis with clear benchmarks for measuring compliance by the parties. If adopted and then implemented improperly, the proposal should lead to a final settle that promotes peaceful relations between Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Armenia.” (A Blueprint for Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis, New England Center for International Law and Policy June 2000. p. 2) Peace talks in France during the second week of February 2005 in which earned sovereignty was proposed failed to bring any result.

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT POSSIBLE

The failure is not with the earned sovereignty plan; rather it is the political concerns of the parties. As Williams and Pecci state, “given that the use of the earned sovereignty approach generally requires the consent of the state and substate entities that are party to a conflict, the precise dimensions of the approach as applied to a particular conflict are shaped by the political concerns of each party involved.” (P. Williams and F. Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, Stanford Journal of International Law 40 (2004) p. 351) The political concerns of leaders in unstable, nationalistic and corrupt states with opposition parties waiting in the lurches, biased media, multinational corporations (especially oil and gas companies), as well as a citizenry that must deal with military drafts, widows, orphans and refugees are perhaps too great at this time for an earned sovereignty plan to work. The leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan depends on the conflict for legitimacy. In Azerbaijan, the current leadership “owes its rise to power to skilful manipulation of popular protest over the handling of the Karabakh issue, and to loud pledges to resolve the conflict quickly and without losses to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. A retreat from this position now would be dangerous and potentially threatening to government’s legitimacy.” (R. Musabayov, “The Karabakh conflict and democratization in Azerbaijan” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) In Armenia “the dominating principle of the incumbent Armenian authorities’ foreign policy is to maintain, as long as possible, the current situation over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and preserve the fragile balance of forces in the South Caucasian region.” (D. Shahnazaryan, “New Challenges and Conflicts in South Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as the Key Regional Conflict” Report from Armenia/the South Caucasus and Foreign Policy Challenges Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor October 2004.)

Are these types of states and leaders in a position to resolve conflicts within its borders and “offer the necessary guarantees of rights to its former autonomous regions? (H. Tchilingirian, “New structures, old foundations: state capacities for peace” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) The likely answer is no. Former OSCE Minsk Group co-chair Carey Cavanaugh stated after the failure of peace talks in 2001 that the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, “were ahead of their people,” (S. Freizer, “A last chance for peace?” in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) but a more likely explanation is that what the leadership says in privately during negotiations and what they say during public political rallies is extremely different. Post-Soviet elitism, secretiveness and centralization create a situation that allows the leadership to control the peace process and perhaps more importantly, information about its contents. “Autonomous civic initiatives to broaden debate on the conflict ­ and specifically what can legitimately be said about it in public ­ are regarded with suspicion, or worse, confronted with charges of ‘capitulation’.” (L. Broers in Accord: The limits of leadership: Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, L. Broers, ed. 2005.) Until the leaderships can stop thinking about their own power and begin thinking about what is best for their people, an earned sovereignty approach cannot resolve the battle between the shields of self-determination and sovereignty that these leaders use to mask their true intentions. The political behaviour behind the masks is too deep and profitable for those involved in negotiations and therefore earned sovereignty, which could be a feasible solution, is not a current possibility for resolution.

Comments hosted at the Armenia Neweurasia site.

I stumbled across this job posting today:

Caucasus Regional Consultant

This is an interim position. The position is located in Baku, Azerbaijan.

…We are looking for seasoned, versatile and energetic professionals for the role of Caucasus Regional Consultant. We will also consider candidates based in Georgia.

The Regional Consultant will be responsible for leading business development initiatives in Azerbaijan and adjacent markets that are critical to the growth of the company. Our ideal candidate will have demonstrated leadership in general management, marketing, sales or business development for an internet/technology or advertising company, and have graduated at the top of their class from a leading graduate academic institution (MBA preferred). We are looking for self-starters who can work with little guidance, tolerate ambiguity and demonstrate leadership with limited oversight. Fluency in English, Azerbaijani and Russian is required.

I wonder what they’re up to? There are google.am, google.ge, and google.az already, but I wonder if they’re looking into doing regional Google ads?

One to keep an eye on!

Last week Einulla Fatullayev, editor of the weekly newspaper Real Azerbaijan, was sentenced to two years imprisonment for “insult of the honor and dignity” of Interior Minister Ramil Usubov. Real Azerbaijan was one of the country’s most independent newspapers, and has ceased publication. At the moment, the sentence has been suspended, meaning that he will not serve time in jail unless other crimes are proved against him in this two year period. He also must pay a fine.

Fatullayev is charged with printing secrets and leaked information, and of being critical of many top government officials. Real Azerbaijan was often critical of Usubov, particularly in connection to an investigation of a group of police officers suspected of murder and kidnapping. Some, however, believe that Real Azerbaijan was representing anti-Usubov forces, particularly Minister of Emergency Situations Kamaleddin Heydarov.

Fatullayev reports harassment and threats on the safety of Real Azerbaijan staff and their families as the reason for the closure of the paper. Eurasianet also cites an anonymous source who claimed that “serious pressure from the presidential administration caused this decision.”

Whatever the reasons behind the shutdown, the end of Real Azerbaijan will be a real loss for Azerbaijani media. The newspaper was popular among NGO staffs and other groups, with a circulation of 29,000. Fatullayev now claims that he will leave journalism.

On top of this, the government has now issued a command that Azerbaijani media outlets cease broadcasting news materials prepared abroad. This will effect such organizations as the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America. Coming on the heels of the Real Azerbaijan decision, the situation for the media in Azerbiajan seems to be going downhill fast.

One has to wonder, why is the government stepping up its suppression of the press now? Three possible reasons present themselves. First, the government stepped up efforts to control the media around the October 6 municipal elections. However, given the lack of attention these elections received, this is not the primary factor. Second, the government is encouraged by recent and continued support from the US government. Instead of criticizing Azerbaijan’s human rights and civil liberties record, the Bush administration praises the Aliyev regime and turns a blind eye to fraudulent elections. Or, these actions can be the result of the reported political shuffle in the upper echelons of the Aliyev regime, in which Usubov, Interior Minster since 1994, is increasingly under attack from other forces inside the government. Most likely a combination of these and other factors are leading to this spiraling environment of repression in Azerbaijan.

We may be on the edge of a period of increased repression and government control in Azerbaijan. We can only hope that both domestic and foreign actors will put pressure on the government to respect the rights of the media instead of turning back towards a closed, state-dominated society.

What follows is one part of a cross-blog initiative that commemorates the 1991 Moscow coup and evaluates the years in between.

On August 19, 1991, while Gorbachev was away on vacation, the State Emergency Committee (SEC) began an ill-fated coup attempt to seize power over the Soviet Union in response to Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika. Boris Yeltsin led the resistance to the coup, and public demonstrations also protested the actions of the hardliner SEC. The army, divided and unsure, took no decisive action, and the coup crumbled. Gorbachev returned and tried to continue his policies as previously planned, but the coup had made all to real the disintegration of the Soviet Union, leading to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Gorbachev’s power.

Azerbaijan’s efforts towards independence began before the coup, however. Azerbaijan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 12, 1991, 4 days before the official end of the Soviet Union. However, Azeri resistance to Soviet rule had begun much earlier. Protests against Soviet rule had been occurring for years, and organized resistance in the form of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan began in 1989. At the same time, both the central Soviet government and the individual Armenian and Azeri Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) were rapidly loosing central power in the face of the secession attempts of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and ethnic violence between Armenians and Azeris.

Moves by Armenia to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh in February 1988 led to ethnic conflicts between Armenians and Azeris in the two SSRs. Pogroms and interethnic violence caused ethnic Azeris in Armenia to flee to the Azeri SSR, and vice versa. In Baku, peaceful demonstrations against the attacks on Azeris in Armenia and against the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh began in late December 1990. On January 13, 1990, in this situation of high uncertainty and ethnic strife, the Armenian population of Baku and Sumgait were the victims of pogroms, with dozens killed.

At the same time, demonstrations calling for greater freedom and independence from the USSR were already occurring in the Azeri SSR. Soon, the Popular Front of Azerbaijan was established, in 1989, by a group of intellectuals and journalists and united many like-minded, non-communist party groups. It can be seen that the Soviet grip on Azerbaijan was weakening well ahead of the failed coup attempt in Moscow, 2 years later.

On January 19, 1990, 26,000 Soviet troops invaded Baku, under the orders of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, signed by Gorbachev. Troops fired into crowds of protestors, killing over 130 civilians and wounding over 700 over the course of 3 days.

While the Soviets say that the invasion of Baku was to protect and evacuate the ethnic Armenian population, most Azeris see it as an attempt by Moscow to forestall the breakup of the Soviet Union and send a message to other SSRs that the Soviet government was willing to use violence to hold together the crumbling federation. Some also say that the events of January 1990 were intended to destroy the Popular Front, given its success in mobilizing the population. Some researchers suggest that the Soviet invasion of Baku was in the planning stages before pogroms even began, and were intended not to protect Armenians, but to crush opposition to Soviet power.

Whatever the motivations, January 20 remains a day of great cultural significance in Azerbaijan. Soviet power lost all legitimacy given the ferocity of the attacks. For 40 days, the Azeri people stayed home from work in mourning and defiance. Resistance to Soviet rule was strengthened. Far ahead of the Moscow Coup, Azerbaijan was already on its way towards independence.

I asked noted human rights campaigner Eldar Zeylanov, director of the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan, what he remembered about the time of the Moscow coup.

“I remember that I as a chief of the information center of the opposition Social-Democratic Party managed with colleagues to remove the computers and our archives to the private flats of our members to prevent their seizure if something would happen.

In 2 days, in last day of the coup, it had been supported by the President Mutalibov [first elected president of independent Azerbaijan]. In several hours after his speech, the coup was suppressed. The next day, August 22, a big and emotional meeting happened before the headquarters of the Popular Front. People were beaten and arrested by police, but were optimistic. They held portraits of Boris Yeltsin and Russian banners as a sign that Russia, which suppressed the Putschists, would support the opposition.”

Neweurasia contributor Marianna Gurtovnik writes:

“I do not remember all the little details about those days. I was 15 when it happened, and I was vacationing in Russia (ironically) at the end of August 1991. One thing I do remember is how horrified my late grandmother was at hearing the news about Gorbachev and his family being locked in their summer house in the Crimea. I suppose she was afraid the coup would turn into a bloody fight and Gorbachev’s reforms would be in danger. My grandparents were brought up with a firm belief in communism but they, nevertheless, were hopeful that Gorbachev’s reforms would bring in positive changes and would advance freedom of speech and public accountability in the USSR.

Another sad development of those days was the suicide of the then Interior Minister, Boris Pugo, who shot himself and his wife as soon as he realized that the coup had failed. The rest of the “putchists” were later released of criminal responsibility and lived peacefully thereafter. But Pugo, apparently, feared the consequences for his political career and his personal reputation so much that he chose to end his and his wife’s lives so abruptly and resolutely.

And, of course, the notorious Swan Lake ballet that they broadcast on TV throughout these days did nothing but raise people’s suspicions…”

As to development since the coup, in Azerbaijan, early promise quickly led to disappointment. The vast majority of elections have been not up to international standards. Mass inflows of oil revenues are doing little to improve the quality of life for most citizens of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan consistently ranks among the most corrupt nations in the world. I asked Zeylanov if he was satisfied with development since independence:

“Of course, I am disappointed.

We are the same little country at the crossing of geopolitical interests, alone with our own problems. And we have the same opposition depending on external support, only the Russian banners and portraits were replaced by American ones.

What happens now is understandable. It’s been described 150 years ago as an initial stage of capitalism. The difference is that we have no market economy but a bazaar one. The market is based on the concept of long-term partnership, marketing, planning, good image making, etc. The bazaar is based on the one moment transaction. Profit now, here, and at the highest possible level without ideas about tomorrow. A lot of dirty money is collected, but the phenomenon is that capital is visible while the capitalists are latent. Political positions are only an umbrella for those capital and businesses. Therefore the economy and politics are closely tied, and political struggle has an immediate affect on certain sectors of the economy. Until the amnesty of dirty capital, the real progress of democracy will be impossible.

Therefore we have irregularities during the elections, weak opposition, a destroyed judiciary, and corrupted law-enforcement agencies. All of this is the best illustration of the idealistic idea of the West to create democratic institutions before the creation of normal economic foundation.”

Freedom House’s Countries at the Crossroads report was released today.

Here’s a link to the Azerbaijan report.

June 13th, 2006 is a date, which Azerbaijan as well as neighboring Georgia and Turkey consider a historical milestone. It is BTC, or Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, a pipeline between three countries, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean. It is the BTC pipeline that is, for a long period of time, a big hope of the Azeri people.

Azerbaijan always was a country full of natural resources. After Azerbaijan gained its independence from the USSR, it seemed quite possible to manage the proper use of raw materials, making the Azeri Nation richer and richer. Unfortunately, it is not as easy as it seemed it would be.

For better understanding of the issue, I would like to recall some facts from the history of oil-rich countries. Maybe a look on their advantages and disadvantages from their oil export, will help us to predict a possible development of Azerbaijan itself.

Let’s take Nigeria as our first example. In the 70s, when the oil boom began, it seemed to be a very prosperous country. Now, it has become one of the poorest countries in the world. Over the years, Nigeria had a lot of alternating regimes on its political scene. These regimes were too busy getting richer themselves, to care about well-being of the country. Another mistake of the Nigerian government was concentrating only on the oil export without investing into other industries.

Another example is Norway. Norway, unlike most oil-rich countries, had already had a developed economy and democratic institutions when it started its oil production. So it was able to regulate oil export, control the income and put money into the development of other industries.

In Botswana, half of the income from oil production goes into the improvement of the educational system, when in Saudi Arabia, another oil-rich country, only 62% of the population can read and write. Unfortunately, the “Saudi Arabia tendency” is observed in a lot of the oil-rich countries.

Another issue which got a lot of my attention was that the opening of the BTC did not have broad response in the international media. Hardly, there were any reports on it, and the ones that were published criticized it severely.

I believe that Azerbaijan will be able to get profit from the project, but there are risks.

Azerbaijan has a chance to go the worst way, using its oil resources to enrich some groups or family clans, not thinking about the future and the time when all of our oil resources will exhaust. However, Azerbaijan also has a chance to go the other, more complex way that will take a lot more effort from the government, but it will bring more benefit to Azeri people. If our government chooses the second way, it means development of all sectors of Azeri economy, making education system better, taking care of Azeri ecology and, of course, making life of every Azerbaijani better.

I hope that experience of the oil-rich countries will help Azerbaijan to make the only right decision. And investments into education and medicine, development of various industries is going to take place in Azerbaijan due to the oil export. The new generation of Azerbaijanis should recognize the only right way for the development of our country, and go toward that direction, for the sake of our nation and its further prosperity, no matter what.

In Azerbaijan, you know it is a holiday when a small graphic of former president Heydar Aliyev appears in the corner of the screen on all television stations in Azerbaijan. However, yesterday’s appearance of Heydar on televisions here left me and my coworkers perplexed. “Another holiday? Then why are we working?”

After some discussion, we realized that the reason for Aliyev’s appearance was that it was the day of the official opening ceremony for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in Turkey. Or, as it is officially referred to in Azerbaijan, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline in the Name of Heydar Aliyev.

Heydar Aliyev is credited by Azerbaijani officials as the man responsible for BTC and the nation’s current stream of revenues from its natural resources. Current president and son of Heydar, Ilham Aliyev, stated, on May 29, the day the first oil arrived in Ceyhan: “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline bears the name of great leader Heydar Aliyev. It was the oil strategy of Azerbaijan initiated by Heydar Aliyev in 1994 that today creates possibilities for all-round development of our country.”

Natig Aliyev, President of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), follows this line, stating “The event also marks the realization of the dream of the people of Azerbaijan and our national leader Heydar Aliyev to realize a pipeline that would bridge the nations of the region and enable Azerbaijan to regain its important role in regional and international economic developments.”

The linking of Heydar Aliyev with the BTC pipeline and his picture’s appearance on TV screens yesterday was another step in the government’s attempts to create a cult of personality around Heydar as part of their nation-building strategy.

In Baku, you can drive from Heydar Aliyev Park down Heydar Aliyev Avenue to Heydar Aliyev Airport. His statue can be found prominently in all cities and towns of Azerbaijan, and signs and billboards displaying his quotes can be found almost everywhere. Sprinkled in with these are quotes of his son, current president Ilham Aliyev, and one billboard shows the two men together, the father speaking, the son listening and rubbing his chin appreciatively, over a backdrop of the Baku Bay with the message “the past, present, and future together” (rough translation).

Heydar Aliyev, who passed away in 2003, is still referred to as the national leader of Azerbaijan. A holiday, the June 15 Day of National Salvation, marks the day in 1992 when Aliyev was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan by Abulfaz Elchibey, the serving Azerbaijani President, with the National Assembly electing him President nine days later.

Clearly all these actions are part of Ilham Aliyev’s attempts to create a national myth around his father, Heydar Aliyev. In almost all ways, Ilham attempts to cloak his government and policies in his father’s legacy, stating on his official website (in his thank you to the people of Azerbaijan for “the rendered trust and election as a President of the Republic of Azerbaijan”) “I will justify this high trust, manage this duty with dignity, continue the policy of Heydar Aliyev.”

Creating a national myth around a leader or “national” historical figure is not rare in post-Soviet Eurasia. What is interesting in Azerbaijan is that Ilham Aliyev is more intent on installing his father in this position than himself. Of course it can be said that in so doing, he is staking the national identity of Azerbaijan to the entire Aliyev family, but it is more than that. It can also be seen as part of Ilham Aliyev’s strategy to present himself to outsiders as a modern leader not in the same category as Turkmenistan’s Turkmenbashi or Uzbekistan’s Karimov.

Popular attitudes towards both father and son vary widely, from those who believe wholeheartedly in Heydar Aliyev as the savior and symbol of their country, to those who see him as “one of the cruelest dictators of the world.” One final question to think about here is why the government continues this policy of instituting Heydar Aliyev and his family as part of the national identity of the country if they themselves do not trust it enough to hold free and fair elections?

Ashot Ghulian and Georgi Petrosian have frustrating jobs. By most accounts, theirs are positions full of prestige and demanding of respect. Ghulian is the speaker of his country’s National Assembly, while Petrosian is the Foreign Minister. The problem? No other country recognizes theirs—the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic—as actually existing. Depending on one’s perspective, Karabakh is part of Armenia, part of Azerbaijan, and an independent country all at the same time.

“Politically, we are a separate country,” Petrosian says. “Geographically and economically, it is difficult to say where the border is.” Ghulian and Petrosian concluded a week-long visit to Boston, New York, and Washington last week, pressing their case with sympathetic members of Congress and Bush Administration officials, while supported by the nearly one-million-strong Armenian population in the U.S.

Nagorno-Karabakh is approaching the fifteenth anniversary of its declaration of independence from the disintegrating Soviet Union, yet when it comes to relations with the outside world, Nagorno-Karabakh, populated almost entirely by ethnic Armenians, functions more or less as a part of Armenia. Citizens carry Armenian passports, and the local currency is the Armenian dram. Representatives are quick to point out, however, that these are necessary compromises only until their independence claims are recognized. The enclave operates de facto, but still unofficial, embassies in a handful of countries, such as Australia, Lebanon, Russia, France, and the U.S.

But inside its own territory, Karabakh has doggedly built up its own domestic political infrastructure, such as the National Assembly of which Ghulian is the speaker. There’s a president with a full cabinet, and elections are held every five years. Unlike its two conflicted neighbors, international monitors have certified parliamentary elections in 2005 as free and fair. All this, the two leaders insist, shows that they are more than ready for—and perhaps more deserving of—independence than a number of other countries in the world. “Nagorno-Karabakh has a stronger argument for recognition than some other recognized countries,” says Ghulian. “We value our achievements because we paid a high price for them.”

Officially, a state of war still exists between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave, though a ceasefire has been in effect since 1994. The question of how to settle the conflict once and for all has been the subject of intense negotiation for over a decade, under the OSCE-mandated Minsk Group, chaired by representatives of the U.S., France, and Russia. The talks are followed intensely in Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert, but so far Azerbaijan refuses to negotiate with Karabakh representatives, fearing that to do so would imply recognition of their independence.

Presidents Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Robert Kocharian of Armenia concluded a summit in Bucharest last month at which—again—no agreement was reached. Reflecting his increasingly pessimistic, or perhaps belligerent, view of a diplomatic settlement, Aliyev subsequently declared the Minsk Group peace process “hopeless,” and swore to recover the territory by any means necessary. Whether this represents merely hard-line posturing for the audience at home or a serious threat to use increasing state oil wealth to develop and wield a stronger military is unclear.

Ghulian and Petrosian aren’t sure how to take such comments, but insist that threats won’t keep them from pressing on with developing their own economy. “We are worried but not scared” that armed conflict could resume, says Petrosian. “We’ve ignored the threat of war to allow democracy to develop. It’s hard to find other countries in a similar situation.” A peaceful solution is more likely, Petrosian believes, if leaders with slightly more respect for democracy come to power in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Still, Ghulian says, “participation in the talks isn’t an end in itself.” The goal is international recognition of their independence.

Assuming the goal is reached eventually, it will almost certainly come with conditions. Both sides of the war absorbed huge numbers of refugees—Armenians coming to Armenia from Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis coming to Azerbaijan from Armenia and Karabakh—and there’s a strong chance that some of those people will want to return to the homes they left so long ago. In Azerbaijan in particular, there are still hundreds of thousands of Karabakh refugees (or technically Internally Displaced Persons, since they were displaced from what is still considered Azerbaijan’s territory) living in makeshift settlements and even tent camps. Will they be allowed to return to an independent Karabakh?

“We are willing to negotiate on any points,” says Petrosian, “if only we knew who to negotiate with.”

Protests in Moscow over Statue of Aliyev

www.today.az reports on protests in Moscow against a statue of Heyday Aliyev. The statue is to be erected near the Baku movie theater in northwest Moscow. Heyday Aliyev, before serving as President of Azerbaijan from 1993 to 2003, was the first Turkic member of the Politburo in 1976 and served as first Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union under Andropov.

The article states that protestors were from the organization Movement against Illegal Migration, which it describes as “radical nationalistic,” and also from the surrounding neighborhood.

Azerbaijan reports that 2.5 million Azerbaijanis live in Russia, with 600,000 living in Moscow (410,000 registered). Many Azerbaijanis come to Russia as migrant labor, working in markets or on construction. Others are part of a permanent, multigenerational diaspora.

This incident shows the tensions between Russian citizens and immigrants and laborers from the former Soviet Union. While the level of physical violence against non-Russians remains lower in Moscow than in other Russian cities, such as St. Petersburg, Azerbaijanis face day-to-day hassles from the police, who single them out for document checks given the high number without official registration. Azerbaijanis are not alone in this harassment—all peoples of the Caucasus, referred to as cherny (black), face police pressure, often attributed to fears of terrorism in relation to the war in Chechnya.

All this is part of the corrupt Russian police system and exclusionary registration system, which leaves police officers dependent on bribes and makes achieving legal residency status very difficult. The result of this situation is poor working and living conditions for Azerbaijanis in Moscow, and reluctance among many Azerbaijanis to travel to Moscow.

Russia should take more care in its treatment of the Azerbaijani diaspora. While 2.5 million people is a small fraction of Russia’s population, it is a huge part of the population of Azerbaijan (population 8 million). The treatment of Azerbaijanis in Russia has a huge influence on public sentiment towards Russia, which is often negative. Russia’s diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan could be hurt by its indifference to or support of nationalism and discrimination. While nationalism may help politicians and parties domestically, Russia needs to learn to show more respect to the now independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Freedom House, an American pro-democracy NGO, released their annual report Nations in Transit on June 13.

Freedom Houses’s aggregate score for Azerbaijan has worsened, going from 5.86 in 2005 to 5.93 in 2006 (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest and 7 the lowest), making this the fourth year in a row that the score has gone down. Out of the 7 factors ranked, Azerbaijan’s score went down on two- electoral process and civil society. All other scores remained the same as in the previous year, with no improvements.

Freedom House’s lower rating of civil society in 2005 stems mainly from the government’s treatment of NGOs with connections to the political opposition, notably the youth organization Yeni Fakir. Also, the report cites continuing problems with registration and taxation for NGOs in general.

As a person currently researching civil society in the Caucasus, I have to disagree with the lowered rating on civil society, based on information from staff of both local and international NGOs who have reported that the registration situation has improved since about 2003, with all but one of the organizations I have talked to currently being registered. While in the past it was difficult to obtain registration, and applications were often turned down without comment, the situation now is clearly better. The Freedom House report focuses in on a few specific and politically motivated cases where registration was denied, and these cases are in the specific area of interest of Freedom House itself. Throughout the sector, NGOs working on issues such as gender, youth, and human rights report widespread success in registering with the Ministry of Justice and improving relations on the whole with the government. Also, all of the organizations I have spoken with reported being able to receive grants even when they were not registered.

While civil society is still developing in Azerbaijan, and increased support from the government is needed in order for it to strengthen, Freedom House’s focus on specific organizations masks other trends within the sector. The government does continue to use bureaucratic measures to create obstacles for organizations it feels threaten its power, but at the same time it has removed these obstacles for the majority of NGOs in Azerbaijan. However, it remains questionable whether registration and taxation are even the best factors to gauge the situation for NGOs in the first place.

What follows is one part of a cross-blog initiative, which takes the role of Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus as its central theme:

Azerbaijani Government proclaimed the country a secular nation immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1991. However, religion remained an important factor shaping Azerbaijan’s domestic policy and its strategic alliances in the region. Secularism gained strong momentum in the early to mid-1990s, when Presidents Abulfaz Elchibey and Heydar Aliyev made efforts to strengthen economic and political alliance with pro-Western secular Turkey. Turkey moved promptly to fill in the void left by Russia: Turkish investments helped prop up Azerbaijan’s shackled economy while Turkey’s support in the foreign policy arena helped rally international opposition to Armenia’s aggression against Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the hindsight, Turkey was unable to buttress its ambitions for dominance among the Turkic nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, its secular state-building continues to serve as a model for independent Azerbaijan.

The spirit of secularism is evident from the 1995 Constitution which does not permit religious figures to run for public offices. This article was invoked during the last year’s parliamentary election of November 6 when the State Election Commission annulled registration of the Chairman of Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA), Hajiaga Nuri, on the grounds that IPA is not registered as a political party with the Ministry of Justice. Two weeks before the elections, Constitutional Court ruled to reinstate Nuri’s candidacy after it was proven that he had renounced all his religious posts, as required by the Constitution.

Azerbaijan’s secular course received an additional boost as a result of growing economic and political rivalries with its southern neighbor, theocratic Iran. The two countries have so far failed to come to consensus over ways to divide the surface and mineral resources of the Caspian Sea. Iran also felt threatened by nationalistic statements of former President Elchibey of Azerbaijan who called for Iranian Azeris to reunite with their brethren in the north. (The 1828 Turkmenchay Treaty between Russia and Iran divided Azerbaijan into two parts: northern Azerbaijan became part of the Russian Empire and then – of the USSR, while southern Azerbaijan joined Iran. As a result of this deal, Iran is now home to a sizable Azeri population – 16 to 30 million, by different estimates. A poll conducted in Iran in 2003 showed, however, that Iranian Azeris were not at all anxious to re-join their former Motherland which currently struggles with corruption and poverty.)

Belligerent sentiments festered in both countries. Some Azerbaijani officials said they suspected Iranian intelligence services in plotting the social unrest in the village of Nardaran in June 2002. A suburb of Baku, Nardaran sustained its reputation as a pocket of devout Muslims even despite the 70+ years of Soviet atheism. (Popular moods in the southern part of Azerbaijan, bordering on Iran, also favor political and economic cooperation with Iran.) Nardaran residents reportedly protested against rampant unemployment, poor water and electricity supply, and the ban on Muslim headscarves (hijabs) that the authorities imposed in May 2002 on female students in public universities. Clashes with the police in Nardaran left one person dead and an estimated 16 to 50 people injured. The court convicted and sentenced 15 residents of Nardaran who were released from custody by the end of 2003.

Debates on hijab, first surfaced in the late 1990s, have split the Azerbaijani society into two camps: those who criticized authorities for abusing religious freedoms, and those who upheld the constitutional separation of religion from state affairs. As the 2002 ban on headscarves in state-funded higher education institutions suggests, the hijab controversy has moved into the classrooms. It has become a part of the country-wide debate about the need for, and the format of, religious education in public schools. Last year, the Ministry of Education officials told the press that religion would be introduced in the near future as an ethics course for 14-17 year olds in public schools.

Registration of religious organizations— handed over, in 2001, from the Ministry of Justice to the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA)—is another thorny issue. SCWRA and its chairman enjoy broad powers over registration of religious groups; they also have the authority to suspend activities of religious groups if they find those to be in violation of Azerbaijan’s laws. In addition, SCRWA controls the publication, import, and distribution of religious literature. Notably, Muslim religious groups must receive a letter of approval from the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) before they can be registered by the SCWRA.

Azerbaijani authorities had, in the past, denied registration to several Islamic charities alleging their connections to terrorist organizations in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Officials claimed that Muslim philanthropists used aid to Azeri refugees as a disguise for religious training that aimed to overthrow Azerbaijan’s secular government.

“The impact of this denial of legal status is that they [religious organizations] can be described in the media as ‘illegal’, have problems getting foreign grants and have no official stamp or letterhead. The financial obstacles are the most serious,” says Eldar Zeynalov of the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijani authorities were also alarmed by the proliferation of various Christian, Buddhist, and Krishnaist sects in the 1990s. Foreign missionaries actively recruited neophytes among Azerbaijan’s impoverished population. The government saw the spread of ‘exotic’ religions as a threat to Azeris’ ethnic identity closely associated with Islam.

“The generally amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, there is popular prejudice against Muslims who convert to non-Islamic faiths and hostility towards groups that proselytize, particularly evangelical Christian and missionary groups”, notes the US State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2005.

A number of non-Muslim groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, and Seventh-day Adventists, remain unregistered but are allowed to operate in the country. They have complained, however, at the obstruction of their activities, including persecution of worshippers, break-up of services by the police, arbitrary fines, and delays in importing religious literature.

On the foreign policy front, religious ‘brotherhood’ did not seem to be a factor in Azerbaijani government’s decision to support America’s anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. Azerbaijan has made its airspace available to the coalition’s air forces during the military operations, and deployed peacekeeping troops in both countries. These steps have once again demonstrated Azerbaijani government’s desire to strengthen the military, economic, and political alliance with the United States.

But Azerbaijan’s responsiveness to US foreign policy priorities has its limits. The security of Azerbaijan’s energy resources may be at stake now that the US Administration contemplates punitive measures against Iran’s nuclear-hungry government. Iranian President Ahmadinejad has promised to retaliate to the US offensive, and Azerbaijan comes to mind as the closest potential target. Besides, air strikes against Iran would cause humanitarian crisis in Azerbaijan if the country faced an in-flux of refugees from across its southern border. It should come as little surprise, therefore, that President Ilham Aliyev refused to back the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities when he met with George Bush in Washington, DC last month. Bush assured Aliyev that the US would strive to resolve Iran’s nuclear conundrum by peaceful and diplomatic means.

BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, US policymakers have been questioning the effectiveness of America’s multi-billion foreign aid programs. In some cases, these programs created dependency on aid in developing nations or allowed for funds’ mismanagement by corrupt governments. To address these concerns, George W. Bush launched the “Millennium Challenge Account” (MCA), an initiative that makes good governance a precondition for America’s assistance to poor countries. In January 2004, after the initiative had received bipartisan endorsement in the Congress, President Bush established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to pioneer the policy.

US foreign aid has been instrumental in promoting American interests worldwide, and South Caucasus is a case in point. Since the mid–1990s, United States have been among the largest donors of humanitarian and developmental projects serving refugees and other under-privileged groups in the South Caucasus. With time, the US have also reaped substantial geostrategic pay-offs in the region. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia aspire to join NATO and have participated in the bloc’s military training program. They’ve also deployed peacekeeping battalions in either Iraq or Afghanistan, or both. After years of sticky negotiations, Russia has promised to withdraw all troops from its military bases in Georgia by 2008. Russia has already closed down two of its four bases in Georgia. And last May, the British Petroleum-led oil consortium launched a long-delayed pipeline to pump Azerbaijan’s “black gold” over to the US and European markets. Financial feasibility of the $3.7 billion pipeline was questioned even by western economists. However, its route through Georgia and Turkey made sense to western diplomats because it circumvented volatile and unpredictable Russia.

Eager to expand the cooperation, the US have insisted that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia improve their record on just governance and economic freedom. Vote-rigging, corrupt courts, muzzling of political dissenters, and pervasive red-tape have bred public discontent and stifled private sector’s growth in all three countries. Last November, US officials chided Armenia and Azerbaijan for falsifying the results of the referendum and parliamentary elections, respectively. The new Georgian government that emerged after the ‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003 enjoys a clear support of the Bush Administration, although it, too, is plagued by human rights violations.

One may now wonder if each of the South Caucasus countries’ governance practices have been reflected in MCC’s recent funding decisions. The answer is not a clear “yes”.

All three countries have a per-capita income of up to $1,435—low enough to be considered poor, under MCC rules. But the agency does not base its decisions on income alone. To qualify for MCC funding, a country must score above the median on the corruption indicator. It must also score above the median on at least half of indicators in three categories: rule of law, investment in people, and economic freedom.

Georgia: Long Way Cut Short

In September 2005, MCC signed a 295.3 million Compact (agreement) with Georgia—the second largest grant the corporation has signed so far. Secretary of State and MCC Board Chair, Condoleezza Rice, who attended the signing ceremony in New York, praised the Georgian Government’s “commitment to political and economic reform”.

Unlike traditional foreign aid where a donor country sets the priorities, MCC encourages governments to identify projects and prepare grant proposals themselves. MCC’s key principle is to “reduce poverty through economic growth”. Georgians will use the Compact money to repair a gas pipeline and prop up small rural businesses. MCC’s additional grant of $4.1 million will finance road rehabilitation in Samtskhe–Javakheti province, home to Georgia’s largely impoverished Armenian community. It is hoped that better roads will halt economic isolation of Armenian farmers by facilitating the delivery of their produce to Georgian markets.

The Compact was signed despite the fact that Georgian government has failed the tests on corruption, rule of law, and the quality of economic regulatory policies. Georgia’s ranking on primary education spending relative to other candidate countries (8%) is also way lower than that of Armenia (50%) and Azerbaijan (60%). Many rural schools in Georgia lack funds to upgrade their dilapidated facilities and infrastructure. Education for ages 6 to 16 is officially free but the US State Department’s human rights report for 2004 points to “endemic bribery” in Georgian public schools where parents are charged informal fees to cover maintenance costs, school supplies, and even teachers’ delayed salaries. “In some cases, students were forced to drop out due to an inability or unwillingness to pay”, the report notes.

In 2005, Transparency International ranked Georgia 130th out of 158 countries surveyed for its “Corruption Perception Index”—a progress by 0.3 points compared to Georgia’s standing in 2004. Georgian parliament took steps to combat corruption by adopting amendments to the Criminal Code in February 2004, and passing the Code of Conduct in October 2004. New criminal legislation has expanded the Prosecutor Office’s authority to charge officials with bribery, eliminated immunity for law enforcement officials, and allowed in-absentia trials for officials who failed to report to court. The Code of Conduct has established ethical norms for parliamentarians.

Armenia: A Semblance of Scrutiny?

The $235.65 million Compact with Armenia for irrigation and rural road rehabilitation was approved in December 2005. Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) reports that Armenian government will match MCC funds to rebuild over 1/3 of the Lifeline Road Network—a route through which Armenia hopes to link to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian–dominated Nagorno-Karabakh province broke away from Azerbaijan in 1988 but hasn’t been internationally recognized as a legal entity.

According to MCC, Armenia has made a strong showing on economic policies where its percentage rankings, relative to other candidate countries, vary from 83 to 99. It has scored below median on political rights and health and education spending.

Rated 88th out of 158 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Armenia can boast a healthier standing on the control of corruption than Azerbaijan and Georgia. But whether it fully satisfies MCC criteria remains a moot point. International observers have criticized Armenian government for the “inflation of turnout numbers, ballot stuffing, and intimidation of observers” in the November 27 referendum on constitutional amendments. MCC’s CEO, John Danilovich, held off the award and issued a warning to Armenian President, Robert Kocharian. Danilovich expressed concern about the “lack of transparency” in the referendum and stressed that MCC would monitor Armenia’s performance throughout the five-year Compact. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian has acknowledged the wrongdoings and pledged in his letter that the government will work hard to fix them. On January 18, Danilovich responded that Oskanian’s explanations had provided “sufficient reasons” for him to proceed with signing the Compact.

Representatives of Armenian NGOs have criticized MCC for a “vague discontent” with the status-quo, adding that the exchange of letters won’t generate a genuine commitment to reforms in the government. They’ve also called for a “more consistent approach” to country assessment—one that would continuously monitor local trends and developments. This comment echoes the Center for Global Development’s recommendation for a more comprehensive monitoring in Georgia to determine the government’s “commitment to strong policies and institutions” over a “sufficient period of time.”

“MCA Compact Countries are required to maintain performance on the selection criteria even after they have received a compact,” said Sherri Kraham, MCC’s Development Policy Director in Washington, DC. She added that MCC’s policy envisages circumstances, under which the agency might suspend or terminate assistance to countries.

Azerbaijan: Is There a Hope?

Azerbaijan’s failing on all six indicators in the “ruling justly” category has essentially disqualified it both from Compact funding and so-called “threshold” funding. MCC’s Threshold Program provides policy advice to governments that have demonstrated commitment to reforms but need to further improve their policies to become fully eligible.

While Azerbaijan’s role as the US’s economic and political partner in the region becomes increasingly important, the pressure on Azerbaijani government to democratize appears to grow as well. Most recently, international observers have criticized Azerbaijan’s presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003 and 2005, respectively, as unjust and non-transparent. Ranked 137th out of 158 countries, Azerbaijan also lags behind its two South Caucasian neighbors on the Transparency International’s corruption scale.

Last October, President Ilham Aliyev heeded to the Council of Europe’s recommendations and signed a decree enforcing public officials’ accountability for procedural violations in the conduct of elections. He also approved the inking of voters’ fingertips to prevent multiple voting. However, observers dismissed these measures, which Aliyev introduced two weeks before the parliamentary ballot, as “too little, too late.” Results in several election districts have been cancelled, with repeat elections scheduled for May 2006.

“Azerbaijan has been a candidate country for each of the past three years”, said MCC’s Sherri Kraham. “We expect that it will be a candidate, and will be reviewed, again for fiscal year 2007”, she noted.

CONCLUSIONS
Despite some legislative advances, Georgian Government still needs to reign in the corruption and improve its economic policies. “Apparently, the MCC Board wanted to support Georgia’s political transition and newly elected president, Mikhail Saakashvili. While this goal is certainly justifiable from a US foreign policy prospective, it is not an appropriate use of MCA funds ” note Sarah Lucas and Steve Radelet of the Center for Global Development (CGD), a Washington, DC–based think tank that monitors MCC activities.

The fact that Armenia was approved for funding despite its checkered record has spurred speculations. Some suggest that, as in Georgia’s case, the Bush Administration wanted to reward a strategic ally. Others talk about the pressure on MCC to “get money out of the door” to prove the agency’s utility to Congress. The $2.5 billion MCC left unspent in 2004–2005 may, in part, explain why the Congress has chopped the agency’s request for 2006 funds from $3 billion to $1.7 billion. Commenting on MCC’s slow start-up, Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, observed: “Combined with the prospect for billions more coming on line in 2007, it seems we have more funding than program. I would prefer that Congress catch up and fund success, than need to justify funding for a potential one.”

According to CGD’s Sheila Herrling, MCC reviews candidate countries’ performance annually, while adding new countries and taking out others.

In theory, this leaves a window of opportunity for Azerbaijani Government but just how much time it might need to sufficiently improve its record is anyone’s guess. However, one should not rule out the possibility of foreign policy agenda overshadowing the US Government’s developmental concerns for yet another time.

Opinions expressed in this article do not represent the views of any organization or institution.

The first officially reported case of HIV transmission occurred in the southern Azerbaijan in 1999 when a patient was infected through blood transfusion. Medical personnel responsible for the horrible mistake have reportedly been prosecuted.

Official statistics on HIV/AIDS in Azerbaijan claims that over 700 people were infected and 60 died by early 2005. However, experts say the figures are woefully under-reported. And it may be true: the CIA World Factbook listed 1,400 HIV/AIDS infected people in Azerbaijan back in 2003. Half of them, according to the United Nations Development Program’s data, are drug addicts; ¼ have been infected through sexual intercourse. Men constitute 70% of this relatively young group, predominantly ages 30 to 39.

In 1996, the then President Heydar Aliyev signed a decree envisaging measures to combat the spread of the disease. The following year, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the National Program on AIDS Prevention. The National AIDS Center, providing round-the-clock testing and a confidential “hot line” service, was established. But the government has failed to back up these praiseworthy initiatives with substantial budgetary allocations. The UN agencies, along with international and local non-government organizations, have taken the lead in educating government employees, civil society organizations, leaders of various religious confessions, and at-risk population (sex workers, drug users, etc.) about ways to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS. They also advocate for policies that would promote human rights and strengthen safety regulations.

On January 20 this year, the Ministry of Justice and the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) held a joint workshop on the prevention and control of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in prisons. Participants discussed possibilities for integration of public health services in the penitentiary system. ICRC’s expertise in both areas was particularly useful as its staff have provided medical care to detainees in many conflict zones worldwide.

Azerbaijan Red Cross has also trained over 250 volunteers and led educational seminars for high school and university students, orphans, and teenagers in refugee camps throughout the country.

Raising the population’s awareness of HIV/AIDS seems to be the right path to pursue. Materials released at the XIV International Conference on AIDS held in Spain in 2002 acknowledged that less than 60% of survey respondents in Azerbaijan were aware of the disease and the ways to prevent it. And up to 98% of young women in the country held major misconceptions about HIV/AIDS. The spread of prostitution and human trafficking among the economically disadvantaged groups add to the growing concern.

From “Trend” news agency

Monitoring On Determination Of Bird Flu In Azerbaijan

The next monitoring on determination of bird flu in Azerbaijan is scheduled for December 15.

Emin Shakbazov, deputy head of the state veterinary service at the Ministry of Agriculture, told Trend news agency that the results of the previous monitoring have been evaluated.

According to him, it is the fifth monitoring implemented in cooperation with specialists of veterinary service, Ministries of Health Care, Ecology and Natural Resources and Institute of Ecology of the Academy of Science.

“No signs of the disease have been revealed during previous monitorings,” Emin Shakhbasov stated.

A number of opposition candidates have embarked on a legal battle, urging judges to cancel what these candidates call fraudulent election results in their districts. Sardar Djalaloglu, co-chairman of Democratic Party, intends to take his claim to the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan after an unfavorable ruling he received at the Supreme Court on November 16. “This is going to be a formal appeal as there are no independent courts in the country”, says Djalaloglu who plans to go as far as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to insist on a repeat tally. Djalaloglu and other angered opposition leaders stress that they possess proofs of vote falsification, are certain of their victory, and will appeal to ECHR if Azerbaijani courts fail to heed to their demands.

The Washington Post has quoted an anonymous US Embassy official as saying that “the US is going to support candidates who can present evidence of fraud”. He added that the US government is “urging the government of Azerbaijan to take swift decisive action on these claims.”

Encouraged by western criticism of elections and the last week’s recounts in favor of two opposition members, the Democratic Front has adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of an independent working group to investigate violations in every district. The Front is comprised of major opposition parties that have come together, shortly after the election, to oppose the ballot rigging. Among the resolution’s signatories are Lala Shovket of the Liberal Party and Ali Kerimli of the Popular Front Party. Both have won the race but say they’ll boycott the new parliament if the government refuses to publicize the true results in disputed districts.

Recounts in select election districts may be the best Azerbaijani opposition can hope to get right now. Revolutionary scenarios similar to Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan look increasingly unlikely in Azerbaijan. For one, there seems to be a strong international preference for political stability in this geo-strategically crucial and resource-rich country. Secondly, Azerbaijani opposition seems to lack the charisma and a fresh “national idea” around which popular masses could be united. In his recent interview to Associated Press, Rasim Musabekov, a reputable political scientist, drew a line of distinction between Azerbaijani opposition and the leaders of “color revolutions” in other post-Soviet nations: “The difference is that (in others) it was a struggle between the reformist, modernizing wing of the ruling elite and the conservative wing. Here it is between the authorities and political forces that have been forced to the periphery and have very few resources.” Musabekov has reasons to be disenchanted with both the ruling elite and its opponents. A long-time member of the opposition Musavat Party, he was compelled to quit to be able to run independently—an attempt proved unsuccessful due to his failure to counter the pro-government candidates’ immense administrative and financial resources.

President Ilham Aliyev’s decrees of May 11 and October 25, 2005 intended to equalize opportunities for the opposition and pro-government candidates in the November 6 parliamentary election. Yet, their actual implementation was not flawless, compelling OSCE and the US State Department to declare that the last week’s vote—with its record number of 1550 registered candidates—fell short of international standards.

According to official results announced on November 7, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) had won 63 out 125 seats in the Azerbaijan’s unicameral legislature, to which deputies are elected based on the majority vote. The figure comprises exactly a half plus one seat and may thus strike as an attempt to enforce NAP’s dominance. Same official count allocated fifty seats to independent candidates, many of whom are believed to be aligned with NAP. The opposition parties were only awarded six votes, which prompted the competing blocs Freedom and New Politics to join forces pressing for a complete rerun of elections. The two blocs staged a peaceful rally in Baku on November 9, which was approved by the city authorities but could not boast as high a turnout as the opposition had initially promised. Another demonstration has been scheduled for Sunday, November 13. According to Ali Aliyev, chairman of Azerbaijan National Independence Party (bloc New Politics), oppositionists are determined to set up their own faction in the parliament. Yet, he was unspecific about the number of seats required for such a faction to materialize.

Freedom’s leaders have called for a “support of a secular Muslim nation” warning the West that its acknowledgement of the rigged vote would alienate democrats in Azerbaijan. However, international criticism has so far taken a milder form than could be expected: no immediate punitive measures for a falsified vote have been imposed on Azerbaijani government. This has led analysts to believe that international watchdogs will not demand a complete rerun and will be satisfied with repeat ballots in select locations where observers have documented grave violations. In a sign indicative of his future reaction to election results, President Bush sent a letter to Ilham Aliyev a few days prior to the vote, confirming the US Administration’s desire to carry on collaboration with Aliyev’s government.

Meanwhile, President Aliyev has dismissed two heads of regional executive governments for interfering with the voting process. Local residents in the provinces have complained at officials extorting the “right” votes by threatening to cut the supply of electricity and water, already meager as it is.

As of November 10, Central Election Commission has annulled results in ten districts. Subsequent recounts in two districts have, to some extent, redressed the pro-government skew of initial results: two opposition members—Ali Kerimli, Popular Front Party’s chairman, and Arzu Samedov, a Musavat Party member,—have been announced winners.

Added by Marianna:

“Monitors Report Fraud in Azerbaijan Parliamentary Vote” by The New York Times

“Angst over Azerbaijan” in The Washington Times:

” Given the circumstances, Azerbaijan might not benefit from the kind of popular uprising that brought democratically elected governments to power in Ukraine and Georgia, with vigorous U.S. support. Such a scenario in Azerbaijan could bring chaos and would not necessarily lead to greater freedoms. To make matters more complicated, since Azerbaijan has oil resources, a nuanced U.S. response will undoubtedly be interpreted by many as a political bow to oil interests.

Reporting by Ben:

Yesterday, downtown Baku saw first protests against the allegedly rigged election results. Azadlig, the opposition party that has called for the demonstrations, must have been somewhat dissappointed though:

Some 15,000 protesters walked down a four-lane road, closed to traffic, under a sea of orange flags a color they borrowed from Ukraine’s protests that forced a new election after charges of fraud.

But the numbers were well short of the 30,000 to 50,000 the opposition had hoped for.

Meanwhile, the government tries to dissolve the growing unease over last Sunday’s poll by awarding a legislative seat for opposition leader Kerimli. There are also reports that President Aliyev is firing some of the regional governors “that seemed to interfere in the elections”.

Another AP story has impressions from the rally and says why not too many people showed up:

“People are afraid to go to this rally,” said Fargana Abdulayeva, a 24-year-old interpreter and opposition supporter in Baku. “People who have government jobs are afraid of losing them.”

Meanwhile, the international media seems to get to terms with the fact that there probably won’t be anything like a revolution in Baku. Some headlines:
“Thousands join protest in Azerbaijan but flame of revolution fails to ignite” - The Independent (UK)
“Protest in Azerbaijan disappoints” - Taipei Times
“Tensions Rise, Abate in Azerbaijan” - LA Times

In the extended entry: Razi Nurullayev of YOX gives his view of Sunday’s poll.

(more…)

I want to thank everyone who helped me figure out this adventure over the last week: as travel guides, translators (from TV to taxis to everything else - language and culture), company, eating buddies, drinking buddies, conversation partners, and all the rest. THANK YOU SO MUCH! If you are ever in London or the US, please let me know what I can help with. I am glad to have met so many great new friends. Also, special thanks to Ben and Mariana, for being great blog partners.

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Originally uploaded by katypearce.

Another nice day in Baku. I could not find any rally this morning. From what I’ve been told, on days that they’ve haven’t been authorized to rally, the groups go in smaller numbers all over the city to make it harder for the cops to find them. When I go back out this afternoon, I will try to hit all of their regular spots. I’ve read that they’ve cancelled the plans for protest, but you never know.

So what happens next? Where does the opposition go? I figure that is the question being asked all over the country.

Members of the opposition in a press conference yesterday said that they will work for, “a peaceful, democratic, non-violent but decisive struggle for cancellation of the parliamentary elections results.” Many candidates have already filed law suits.